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The Polis Philosophers 
 
To help with the project of gaining an understanding of the relationship and 
communication that occurs between the humanities and sciences, this paper will look to 
the natural philosophers of archaic Greece.  Considerable advances in both the humanities 
and sciences occur during this period of Greek history, and we will defend the thesis that 
this is no coincidence.  The Greek example shows one way in which the development of 
scientific thinking itself rests upon a culture’s foundation of social and political values.  
Key for the Greeks of this period was the importance of debate.  The polis, the basic unit 
of community life for the Greeks of this time, serves as a forum within which debate can 
occur, and the Greeks were keenly interested in questions such as what particular form 
constitutes the ideal polis, what kind of life is happiest, and how best to judge good 
argumentation.  These questions are, of course, the domain of the humanities.  What is 
interesting for our purposes is how these questions lead to a revolution in scientific 
inquiry.  With this perspective, we can move into an investigation of the earliest natural 
philosophers, and what role they played in the polis. 
 
At the end of an often neglected fragment, Xenophanes laments the recognition he 
receives from the state, especially when compared to the honours heaped on athletes 
victorious at the Olympic games: “and even if he were to win with horses he would get 
all these, not being as worthy of them as I.  For our expertise is better than the strength of 
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men and horses.  But this practice makes no sense, nor is it right to prefer strength to this 
good expertise”.1  The conclusion here rests on his observation that athletic victories do 
not enhance the administration of the polis, while his own wisdom does.  The fragment 
continues, “neither if there were a good boxer among the people, nor if there were a 
pentathlete or wrestler . . . would for this reason a city [polis] be better governed”.  
 
Xenophanes thus raises the question of how he in particular, and by extension possibly all 
the early philosophers, have utility to the polis.  Diogenes Laertius tells us that 
Parmenides “served as a legislator” for Elea,2 and similarly Thales is thought to have had 
some kind of role in governing his home city.  Based on this report of service, one answer 
to the question relies on the most direct route possible: they use their wisdom to craft 
good laws.  But this can, at best, be only a part of an answer to the riddle posed by the 
fragment of Xenophanes. The mere fact of early philosophers leaving behind writing is a 
provocative observation in considering the social implications of their thought; it argues 
against understanding the importance of the early philosophers being based upon a role of 
active legislators within a polis.   
 
Diogenes’ narrative is doubtable, as he is notorious for being loose with the truth of 
biographical details.  Any account of the role of the early philosophers in polis culture 
that need not make use of his reports as to their personal history is thus on safer ground.3  
Furthermore, this preliminary interpretation cannot help us to explain the relevance of 
Xenophanes himself or other philosophers that do not take on a legislative function; 
Xenophanes is the prototypical wandering philosopher, and, not being a citizen in any of 
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the cities he visited, would be unable to directly participate in the political process.  As he 
himself tells us, “already there are seven and sixty years, tossing about my counsel 
throughout the land of Greece” (fragment 8), and “I tossed about, bearing myself from 
city to city” (fragment 45).4  Of course Xenophanes could have fulfilled the role of 
advisor, in the vein of say, Protagoras advising Pericles; if Xenophanes was successful in 
this, one wonders at the import of our opening fragment, which indicates dissatisfaction 
with the respect accorded him by cities.  There is no record of Xenophanes being 
involved in legislation in any way, and if possible it would be best not to resort to such 
speculation in assessing fragment 2.  In any case, this line of thinking gives us no 
explanation of early philosophy itself having a substantive role in stabilizing or 
supporting polis culture, just that some legislators moonlighted as philosophers.  To take 
the skeptic’s case further still, what are we to make of the philosophers that positively 
avoided public service?  Heraclitus deposits his famous “book” in the Temple of Artemis 
in Ephesus, thus making it a public document, or at least more of a public document than 
if he had kept it to himself (D.L. 9.5-6), but his conduct regarding the book is fascinating 
in part because it is combined with his unwillingness to directly engage in public life and 
his opinion of the understanding of others; in all probability he was dismayed by the 
prospects of common people ever understanding his work.5  While Heraclitus was 
unwilling to take up public duties himself, he did think enough of his work to allow it 
some influence in the public sphere. 
 
In trying to understand how the “wisdom” (sophia) of these philosophers might aid the 
polis,6  Jaeger championed the claim that these early thinkers facilitated the transition in 
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Greek culture to a more analytical and rational perspective.7  On this account we might 
speculate that cities are benefited in various ways but specifically by the ability to enact 
better legislation through a more rational process of problem solving; the philosophers 
help bring the cities to such a rationalist position.  This answer gives the philosophers the 
Herculean task of changing the mindset of the polis from irrational to rational, but the 
ability of any small group of people being able to effect such a transition is questionable.  
Indeed, the rise of rationalism in the polis period has been referred to as the Greek 
miracle, and this because it was thought that such a change is unexplainable.8   More 
recent work has revealed the foundational importance of debate to the polis from the very 
beginning, signaling an inherent amenability to good argumentation.9  On the 
methodological front it is not so much the case that early philosophers effect the 
transition themselves, but rather that they participate in the unfolding of the inherently 
discursive nature of the polis.  More germane to our point, this methodological response 
ignores the actual content of the philosophy being put forward, praising how it says 
things but not what is actually said.  What is desired for a fuller understanding of the role 
of early philosophers is an interpretation that can explain their role by referring to the 
actual content of the philosophy.10 
 
The immediate problem faced by anyone looking to delve into the relevance of these 
philosophers to the polis lies in their fascination with nature.  A predilection for 
cosmology seems a long way off from being relevant to that most human and artificial of 
constructs, the polis.  However, the polis presents its own unique set of demands in being 
understood, especially when we turn to its discursive nature.  The need for a theoretical 
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grounding of the system itself exists in any political association constructed upon open 
debate in a way not present in authoritarian contexts.  One identifying marker of polis 
culture is the extent to which it directs itself at the question of which constitution is best, 
and the basic options range from full-fledged democracy through various broadly-based 
and limited oligarchies down to the tyranny of one.  Such a debate is unheard of outside 
of the argumentative confines of the polis; in well established authoritarian cultures the 
rule of many does not warrant serious contemplation.  What makes the debate different 
within the polis is the real possibility of a change in political structure, should the results 
of the debate warrant it.  The history of Athenian tinkering with its own constitutional 
structure bears this out, as does the sheer variety of constitutions present within the polis 
system.  That being said, the reality of the polis as itself constituting a forum within 
which meaningful discourse can take place presents real limits to the extent to which the 
constitutional debate can be taken.  Should the polis decide to embrace monarchical rule, 
it would no longer be a polis.  There is an inherent tension, then, between the need to be 
able to have the argument concerning which constitution is best, and the need to preserve 
the debating forum as an arena within which relatively balanced interests can compete 
and debate with each other.  If the system loses the balance of power, then the political 
structure collapses into some form of authoritarianism, and the meaningfulness of the 
debate is lost.  For the forum itself to persevere, it needs an analysis within the debate that 




It is into this gap that the early philosophers and their cosmological interests can be fitted.  
The philosophers’ investigation of the cosmos will reveal the “natural” foundations of the 
polis.  The debate that goes on between philosophers concerning the fundamental 
constitution of the universe reprises the constitutional debate of the polis on a grander 
scale, and we can find different philosophers to champion either monistic or pluralistic 
views of nature.  At stake is an argument that shows either harmony or dissonance 
between polis and universe, thus providing powerful theoretical ammunition in the debate 
over what governmental form the polis should adopt.  The Greeks take naturalistic 
arguments quite seriously; the “is/ought fallacy” is a modern phenomenon virtually 
unknown to the polis period.11  If the philosophers in their investigations uniformly 
conclude that the natural world is a hierarchy with one dominant member or element 
obviously holding a position of primacy and control, citizens would be forced to 
recognize the dissonance between the structure of society and the structure of reality.  
Conversely, the inverse conclusion also holds.  Should the philosophers return a verdict 
of pluralism, the argumentative character of the polis would be vindicated on naturalistic 
grounds.  Armed with a view of nature that shows it to be a context in which various 
elements compete but never overwhelm each other, Greeks could look to the polis as the 
natural instantiation of this reality in the realm of human interaction.  For a Greek of the 
period, the polis would have been the most natural of human societies possible (as 
opposed to the tyrannical regimes in the surrounding Mediterranean), and here we 
understand ‘natural’ to be taken in its most literal sense.  This provides the polis with a 
strong justification of its own existence, and we see the rise of a natural law-type of 
argument that works to preserve the polis as a forum of competition and can allow for 
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fluidity in the balance of power without total collapse.  The import of this endeavour 
should not be understated: these philosophers help to stabilize the polis by grounding its 
ideological axioms in nature. 
As mentioned, the cosmological version of this debate reflects that taking place at the 
more human level, and, unsurprisingly, we do find some early philosophers endorsing a 
hierarchical model of the cosmos.  Thus Thales famously posits water as a “first 
principle” and Anaximenes air.12  It is interesting that both of these models occur at the 
very earliest phase of natural philosophy, and that we know the least about them.  It is 
therefore unclear just how hierarchical either of these natural systems are, and caution is 
required is assessing their place in this analysis of the early cosmologies.  Regardless, this 
position is delivered a crushing blow by the argumentation of Anaximander, whose own 
model of a plurality of elements presents an opposing model of fluid structure that will 
not collapse into uniformity.13  As quoted by Simplicius, providing a gloss on 
Anaximander’s thought: “for they [the elements] give penalty (dike) and recompense to 
one another for their injustice (adikia) in accordance with the order of time—speaking of 
them in rather poetical terms.  It is clear that having seen the change of the four elements 
into each other, he did not think it fit to make some one of these underlying things 
primary”.14  In explaining Anaximander’s reasoning, Aristotle tells us that if one of the 
elements were primary, then it would destroy the others, or at least that the others would 
have been completely converted into it by now (recognizing, as Anaximander does, that 
the elements do change into each other).  But of course we now observe all the different 
elements, and therefore no one of them is primary.15 
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With this move the understanding of the universe as a changing array of elements comes 
to the fore.16  Xenophanes also engages in natural philosophy, and he is rigorous in his 
application of a theory of elements to the explication of physical phenomena.  He seems 
to base his system on only two elements, earth and water, and from them and their 
mixtures is able to generate all other natural phenomena.17  Thus clouds and wind are 
formed out of the sea, rain falls from the clouds, rivers form, and flow back into the sea 
(fragment 30).  We have further reports that Xenophanes thought there would come a 
time “when the land sinks into the sea and becomes mud, at which time generation begins 
again,”18 and so the elements are locked in a continuous cycle of growth and diminution, 
a narrative that is to be found in outline in virtually all of the remaining earliest 
philosophers.  Here we can give but a brief survey of the other philosophers, but it will 
suffice to provide a view of the general trend.  Empedocles gives an account of the four 
cardinal elements (earth, fire, air, water) plus the forces of love and strife.  These 
elements and forces are continuously at play: “in this respect they come to be and have no 
constant life; but insofar as they never cease from constantly interchanging, in this 
respect they are always unchanged in a cycle”.19  It is true that Heraclitus prioritizes fire, 
but that is because fire is change par excellence; Heraclitus will not allow for static 
elements of any kind within his system.  He does, however, stress the importance of a 
balance that is created between opposing forces: “what opposes unites: the finest 
attunement stems from things bearing in opposite directions, and all things come about by 
strife,” and “they do not understand how, while being at variance, it is in agreement with 
itself.  There is a back-turning connection, like that of a bow or a lyre”.20 Aristotle gives 
us a list of ten opposites that the Pythagoreans believed were somehow constitutive of the 
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world, beginning with limited/unlimited.  Apparently it was the interaction of this pair 
that creates the reality of the elemental numbers constituting the world.21  The Atomists 
provide perhaps the most radically pluralistic universe of them all, going so far as to say 
that “the eternal existents consist in minute substances, infinite in number”.22  Most 
distressing is the apparent loss of concern for the whole in this system: a full account of 
the atoms is enough to explain the universe, and the void, within which atoms combine 
and interact, is given the troubling status of “non-existent”.  Furthermore, “no plurality, 
Leucippus said, could arise from what is truly multiple”.23  It seems that for the Atomists, 
the problem of the one and the many is solved by disavowing any ontological status to 
the one.  Even Parmenides, the great monist of the early philosophical tradition, finds it 
fitting to combine his “Way of Truth” with a much longer “Way of Seeming”, in which a 
cosmology of elements presents itself: “But since all things have been named light and 
night, and these have been applied according to their powers to these things and to those, 
all is full of light and obscure night together”.24  In describing the universe that we live in, 
Parmenides fits squarely within the polis-validating tradition, and, close to the beginning 
of the Way of Truth, even has this to say about the Way of Seeming: “But nevertheless 
you shall learn these things as well, how the things which seem had to have genuine 
existence, permeating all things completely”.25  While these thinkers express great variety 
in their thought, the uniformity of this elemental aspect to their natural philosophies 
deserves emphasis.  Returning to our original fragment, we can broaden the discussion to 
conclude that the early philosophers and their wisdom are a boon to government because 
they show just how legitimate traditional polis governance is; by extension, they highlight 
the need to protect and preserve the fundamentals of the system.  Indeed it is for this 
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reason that they deserve to be called the Polis Philosophers, as their work serves the 
purpose of helping to stabilize the polis as an established form of social organization. 
So far we have explained early philosophy as providing the groundwork of the polis, but 
of course, the process is operating in the other direction as well.  In other words, it is no 
surprise that philosophers who are products of the polis in their thinking should find a 
reflection of the polis in nature; they are far from providing an unbiased and “scientific” 
examination of the universe.  If, as is being argued here, the project of natural philosophy 
gets its impetus from an interest in providing the social world with a persuasive 
justification for its own makeup, then the criteria for acceptable results on the part of the 
polis philosophers are already well established.  But we should not be too hard on this 
projection of political realities onto nature, for while it does circumscribe how the cosmos 
is to be understood, it also liberates the Greek mind from the more usual Mediterranean 
ways of thinking.  The polis philosophers tell us that, when dealing with the interaction 
between arts and sciences, as often as not there is an underlying harmony of perspective 
that drives both worlds.  Hence the advent of natural inquiry goes hand in hand with the 
rise of a culture of rhetoric and persuasion, and indeed supports that culture by validating 
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